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Abstract. The existential theory of the reals (ETR) consists of exis-
tentially quantified boolean formulas over equalities and inequalities of
real-valued polynomials. We propose the approximate existential theory
of the reals (-ETR), in which the constraints only need to be satisfied
approximately. We first show that unconstrained -ETR = ETR, and
then study the -ETR problem when the solution is constrained to lie in
a given convex set. Our main theorem is a sampling theorem, similar to
those that have been proved for approximate equilibria in normal form
games. It states that if an ETR problem has an exact solution, then it
has a k-uniform approximate solution, where k depends on various prop-
erties of the formula. A consequence of our theorem is that we obtain a
quasi-polynomial approximation scheme (QPTAS) for a fragment of con-
strained -ETR. We use our theorem to create several new PTAS and
QPTAS algorithms for problems from a variety of fields.
1 Introduction
Sampling techniques. The Lipton-Markakis-Mehta algorithm (LMM) is a
well known method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in normal form
games [29]. The key idea behind their technique is to prove that there exist
approximate Nash equilibria where both players use simple strategies.
Suppose that we have a convex set C = conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) defined by vectors
c1 through cl. A vector x ∈ C is k-uniform if it can be written as a sum of the
form (β1/k) · c1 + (β2/k) · c2 + · · ·+ (βl/k) · cl, where each βi is a non-negative
integer and
∑l
i=1 βi = k.
Since there are at most lO(k) k-uniform vectors, one can enumerate all k-
uniform vectors in lO(k) time. For approximate equilibria in n×n bimatrix games,
Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta showed that for every  > 0 there exists an -Nash
equilibrium where both players use k-uniform strategies where k ∈ O(log n/2),
and so they obtained a quasi-polynomial approximation scheme (QPTAS) for
finding an -Nash equilibrium.
Their proof of this fact uses a sampling argument. Every bimatrix game
has an exact Nash equilibrium (NE), and each player’s strategy in this NE is a
probability distribution. If we sample from each of these distributions k times,
and then construct new k-uniform strategies using these samples, then when
k ∈ O(log n/2) there is a positive probability the new strategies form an -NE.
So by the probabilistic method, there must exist a k-uniform -NE.
The sampling technique has been widely applied. It was initially used by
Altho¨fer [1] in zero-sum games, before being applied to non-zero sum games by
Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [29]. Subsequently, it was used to produce algo-
rithms for finding approximate equilibria in normal form games with many play-
ers [3], sparse bimatrix games [4], tree polymatrix [5], and Lipschitz games [21].
It has also been used to find constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix
games with bounded treewidth [19].
At their core, each of these results uses the sampling technique in the same
way as the LMM algorithm: first take an exact solution to the problem, then
sample from this solution k times, and finally prove that with positive probability
the sampled vector is an approximate solution to the problem. The details of
the proofs, and the value of k, are often tailored to the specific application, but
the underlying technique is the same.
The existential theory of the reals. In this paper we ask the following ques-
tion: is there a broader class of problems to which the sampling technique can
be applied? We answer this by providing a sampling theorem for the existential
theory of the reals. The existential theory of the reals consists of existentially
quantified formulae using the connectives {∧,∨,¬} over polynomials compared
with the operators {=,≤, <,≥, >}. For example, each of the following is a for-
mula in the existential theory of the reals.
∃x∃y∃z · (x = y) ∧ (x > z) ∃x · (x2 = 2)
∃x∃y · ¬(x10 = y100) ∨ (y ≥ 4) ∃x∃y∃z · (x2 + y2 = z2)
Given a formula in the existential theory of the reals, we must decide whether
the formula is true, that is, whether there do indeed exist values for the variables
that satisfy the formula.
The complexity class ETR is defined to be all problems that can be reduced
in polynomial time to the existential theory of the reals. It is known that ETR
⊆ PSPACE [13], and NP ⊆ ETR since the problem can easily encode Boolean
satisfiability. However, the class is not known to be equal to either PSPACE or
NP, and it seems to be a distinct class of problems between the two. Many prob-
lems are now known to be ETR-complete, including many problems involving
constrained equilibria in normal form games with at least three players [6–9, 23].
Our contribution. In this paper we propose the approximate existential theory
of the reals (-ETR), where we seek a solution that approximately satisfies the
constraints of the formula. We show a subsampling theorem for a large fragment
of -ETR, which can be used to obtain PTASs and QPTASs for the problems
that lie within it. We believe that this will be useful for future research: instead
of laboriously reproving subsampling results for specific games, it now suffices
to simply write a formula in -ETR and then applying our theorem gives the
desired result. To exemplify this, we prove several new QPTAS and PTAS results
using our theorem.
Our first result is actually that -ETR = ETR, meaning that the problem of
finding an approximate solution to an ETR formula is as hard as finding an exact
solution. However, this result crucially relies on the fact that ETR formulas can
have solutions that are doubly-exponentially large. This motivates the study of
constrained -ETR, where the solutions are required to lie within a given convex
set.
Our main theorem (Theorem 2) gives a subsampling result for constrained
-ETR. It states that if the formula has an exact solution, then it also has
a k-uniform approximate solution, where the value of k depends on various
parameters of the formula, such as the number of constraints and the number
of variables. The theorem allows for the formula to be written using tensor
constraints, which are a type of constraint that is useful in formulating game-
theoretic problems.
The consequence of the main theorem is that, when various parameters of
the formula are constant (see Corollary 1) we are able to obtain a QPTAS for
approximating the existential theory of the reals. Specifically, this algorithm
either finds an approximate solution of the constraints, or verifies that no exact
solution exists. In many game theoretic applications an exact solution always
exists, and so this algorithm will always find an approximate solution.
It should be noted that we are not just applying the well-known subsampling
techniques in order to derive our main theorem. Our main theorem incorporates
a new method for dealing with polynomials of degree d, which prior subsampling
techniques were not able to deal with.
Our theorem can be applied to a wide variety of problems. In the game the-
oretic setting, we prove new results for constrained approximate equilibria in
normal form games, and approximating the value vector of a Shapley game. We
also show optimization results. Specifically, we give approximation algorithms for
optimizing polynomial functions over a convex set, subject to polynomial con-
straints. We also give algorithms for approximating eigenvalues and eigenvectors
of tensors. Finally, we apply the theorem to some problems from computational
geometry.
2 The Existential Theory of the Reals
Let x1, x2, . . . , xq ∈ R be distinct variables, which we will treat as a vector x ∈
Rq. A term of a multivariate polynomial is a function T (x) := a·xd11 ·xd22 ·· · ··xdqq ,
where d1, d2, . . . , dq are integers and a ∈ R. A multivariate polynomial is a
function p(x) := T1(x) + T2(x) + · · · + Tt(x) + c, where each Ti is a term as
defined above, and c ∈ R is a constant.
We now define Boolean formulae over multivariate polynomials. The atoms
of the formula are polynomials compared with {<,≤,=,≥, >}, and the formula
itself can use the connectives {∧,∨,¬}.
Definition 1. The existential theory of the reals consists of every true sentence
of the form ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xq ·F (x), where F is a Boolean formula over multivariate
polynomials of x1 through xq.
Given a Boolean formula F , the ETR problem is to decide whether F is a
true sentence in the existential theory of the reals. We will say that F has m
constraints if it uses m operators from the set {<,≤,=,≥, >} in its definition.
The approximate ETR. In the approximate existential theory of the reals,
we replace the operators {<,≤,≥, >} with their approximate counterparts. We
define the operators < and > with the interpretation that x < y holds if and
only if x < y +  and x > y if and only if x > y − . The operators ≤ and ≥
are defined analogously.
We do not allow equality tests in the approximate ETR. Instead, we require
that every constraint of the form x = y should be translated to (x ≤ y)∧(y ≤ x)
before being weakened to (x ≤ y) ∧ (y ≤ x).
We also do not allow negation in Boolean formulas. Instead, we require that
all negations are first pushed to atoms, using De Morgan’s laws, and then further
pushed into the atoms by changing the inequalities. So the formula ¬((x ≤
y) ∧ (a ≥ b)) would first be translated to (x ≥ y) ∨ (a ≤ b) before then being
weakened to (x ≥ y) ∨ (a ≤ y).
Definition 2. The approximate existential theory of the reals consists of ev-
ery true sentence of the form ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xq · F (x), where F is a negation-free
Boolean formula using the operators {<,≤,≥, >} over multivariate polyno-
mials of x1 through xq.
Given a Boolean formula F , the -ETR problem asks us to decide whether F
is a true sentence in the approximate existential theory of the reals, where the
operators {<,≤,≥, >} are used.
Unconstrained -ETR. Our first result is that if no constraints are placed on
the value of the variables, that is if each xi can be arbitrarily large, then -ETR
= ETR for all values of  ∈ R. We show this via a two way reduction between
-ETR and ETR. The reduction from -ETR to ETR is trivial, since we can just
rewrite each constraint x < y as x < y+ , and likewise for the other operators.
For the other direction, we show that the ETR-complete problem Feas, which
asks us to decide whether a system of multivariate polynomials (pi)i=1,...,k has
a shared root, can be formulated in -ETR. Here we rely on a result of Schaefer
and Stefankovic [31], which showed that Feas has a solution if and only if there
is a point x such that |pi(x)| < 2−2L+5 for all i, where L is the number of
bits used to represent the polynomials. To formulate the problem in -ETR, we
blow-up the instance by multiplying each polynomial by a doubly-exponentially
large number t that is bigger than  ·22L+5 . The number t can be constructed by
a polynomially-sized formula that uses repeated squaring. So if we write down
the constraint t · pi(x) ≤ 0 in -ETR, then this implies that t · pi(x) ≤  and
therefore pi(x) < 2
−2L+5 . Thus, via the lemma of Schaefer and Stefankovic, we
can formulate Feas in the -ETR. The full details of this reduction are given in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. -ETR = ETR for all  ∈ R.
Constrained -ETR. In our negative result for unconstrained -ETR, we
abused the fact that variables could be arbitrarily large to construct the doubly-
exponentially large number t. So, it makes sense to ask whether -ETR gets
easier if we constrain the problem so that variables cannot be arbitrarily large.
In this paper, we consider -ETR problems that are constrained by a convex
set in Rq. For vectors c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq we use conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) to denote the
set containing every vector that lies in the convex hull of c1 through cl. In the
constrained -ETR, we require that the solution of the -ETR problem should
also lie in the convex hull of c1 through cl.
Definition 3. Given a Boolean formula F and vectors c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq, the
constrained -ETR problem asks us to decide whether
∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xq ·
(
x ∈ conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) ∧ F (x)
)
.
Note that, unlike the constraints used in F , the convex hull constraints are
not weakened. So the resulting solution x1, x2, . . . , xq, must actually lie in the
convex set.
3 Approximating Constrained -ETR
Polynomial classes. To state our main theorem, we will use a certain class of
polynomials where the coefficients are given as a tensor. This will be particularly
useful when we apply our theorem to certain problems, such as normal form
games. To be clear though, this is not a further restriction on the constrained
-ETR problem, since all polynomials can be written down in this form.
The variables of the polynomials we will study will be p-dimensional vectors
denoted as x1, x2, . . . , xn, where xj(i) will denote the i-th element of vector xj .
The coefficients of the polynomials will be a tensor denoted by A. Given a ×nj=1p
tensor A, we denote by a(i1, . . . , in) its element with coordinates (i1, . . . , in) on
the tensor’s dimensions 1, . . . , n, respectively, and by α we denote the maxi-
mum absolute value of these elements. We define the following two classes of
polynomials.
– Simple tensor multivariate.
We will use STM(A, xd11 , . . . , x
dn
n ) denote an STM polynomial with n vari-
ables where each variable xj , j ∈ [n] is applied dj times on tensor A that
defines the coefficients. Tensor A has
∑n
j=1 dj dimensions with p indices
each. We will say that an STM polynomial is of maximum degree d, if for
every j ∈ [n] it holds that dj ≤ d. An example of a degree 2 simple tensor
polynomial with two variables is the following:
STM(A, x2, y) =
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
x(i) · x(j) · y(k) · a(i, j, k) + 10.
This polynomial itself is written as follows.
STM(A, xd11 , . . . , x
dn
n ) =∑
i1,1∈[p]
· · ·
∑
in,dn∈[p]
(x1(i1,1)) · . . . · (x1(i1,d1)) · . . . · (xn(in,1)) · . . . · (xn(in,dn))·
· a(i1,1, . . . , i1,d1 . . . , in,1, . . . , in,dn) + a0.
– Tensor multivariate. A tensor multivariate (TMV) polynomial is the sum
over a number of simple tensor multivariate polynomials. We will use TMV(x1, . . . , xn)
to denote a tensor multivariate polynomial with n vector variables, which is
formally defined as
TMV(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i∈[t]
STM(Ai, x
di1
1 , . . . , x
din
n ),
where the exponents di1, . . . , din depend on i, and t is the number of simple
multivariate polynomials. We will say that TMV(x1, . . . , xn) has length t if
it is the sum of t STM polynomials, and that it is of degree d if for every
i ∈ [t] and every j ∈ [n] it holds that dij ≤ d.
-ETR with tensor constraints. We focus on -ETR instances F where all
constraints are of the form TMV(x1, . . . , xn) ./ 0, where ./ is an operator from
the set {<,≤, >,≥}. Recall that each TMV constraint considers vector vari-
ables. We consider the number of variables used in F (denoted as n) to be the
number of vector variables used in the TMV constraints. So the value of n used in
our main theorem may be constant if only a constant number of vectors are used,
even if the underlying -ETR instance actually has a non-constant number of
variables. For example, if x and y and w are p-dimensional probability distribu-
tions and A1 and A2 are p×p tensors, the TMV constraint xTA1y+wTA2x > 0
has three variables, degree 1, length two; though the underlying problem has 3 ·p
variables.
Note that every -ETR constraint can be written as a TMV constraint, be-
cause all multivariate polynomials can be written down as a TMV polynomial.
Every term can be written as a STM polynomial where the tensor entry is non
zero for exactly the combination of variables used in the term, and 0 other-
wise. Then a TMV polynomial can be constructed by summing over the STM
polynomial for each individual term.
The main theorem. Given an -ETR formula F , we define exact(F ) to be
a Boolean formula in which every approximate constraint is replaced with its
exact variant, meaning that every instance of x ≤ y is replaced with x ≤ y, and
likewise for the other operators.
Our main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 2. Let F be an -ETR instance with n vector variables and m multivariate-
polynomial constraints each one of maximum length t and maximum degree d,
constrained by a convex set defined by c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rnp . Let α be the maximum
absolute value of the coefficients of constraints of F , and let γ = maxi ‖ci‖∞. If
exact(F ) has a solution in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl), then F has a k-uniform solution
in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) where
k =
48 · n6 · d5 · γ2d+2 · α6 · t4 · ln(2 · n · d · γ · α ·m · t)
4
. (1)
Consequences of the main theorem. Our main theorem gives a QPTAS for
approximating a fragment of -ETR. The total number of k-uniform vectors in
a convex set C = conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) is l
O(k). So, if the parameters α, γ, d, t,
and n are all constant, then our main theorem tells us that the total number
of k-uniform vectors is lO(logm), where m is the number of constraints. So if we
enumerate each k-uniform vector x, we can check whether F holds, and if it
does, we can output x. If no k-uniform vector exists that satisfies F , then we
can determine that exact(F ) has no solution. This gives us the following result.
Corollary 1. Let F be an -ETR instance constrained by the convex set defined
by c1, c2, . . . , cl. If α, γ, d, t, and n are constant, and l is polynomial, then we
have an algorithm that runs in time lO(logm) that either finds a solution to F ,
or determines that exact(F ) has no solution.
If m is constant and l is polynomial then this gives a PTAS, while if m and l
are polynomial, then this gives a QPTAS.
In Section 5 we will show that the problem of approximating the best social
welfare achievable by an approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player normal
form game can be written down as a constrained -ETR formula where α, γ,
d, and m are constant. It has been shown that, assuming the exponential time
hypothesis, this problem cannot be solved faster than quasi-polynomial time [11,
20], so this also implies that constrained -ETR where α, γ, d, and m are constant
cannot be solved faster than quasi-polynomial time unless the exponential time
hypothesis is false.
Many -ETR problems are naturally constrained by sets that are defined
by the convex hull of exponentially many vectors. The cube [0, 1]n is a natural
example of one such set. Brute force enumeration does not give an efficient
algorithm for these problems, since we need to enumerate lO(k) vectors, and
l is already exponential. However, our main theorem is able to provide non-
deterministic polynomial time algorithms for these problems.
This is because each k-uniform vector is, by definition, the convex combina-
tion of at most k of the vectors in the convex set, and this holds even if l is
exponential. So, provided that k is polynomial, we can guess the subset of vec-
tors that are used, and then verify that the formula holds. This is particularly
useful for problems where exact(F ) always has a solution, which is often the case
in game theory applications, since it places the approximation problem in NP,
whereas computing the exact solution may be ETR-complete.
Corollary 2. Let F be an -ETR instance constrained by the convex set defined
by c1, c2, . . . , cl. If α, γ, d, t, n, are polynomial, then there is a non-deterministic
polynomial time algorithm that either finds a solution to F , or determines that
exact(F ) has no solution. Moreover, if exact(F ) is guaranteed to have a solution,
then the problem of finding an approximate solution for F is in NP.
A theorem for non-tensor formulas. One downside of Theorem 2 is that
it requires that the formula is written down using tensor constraints. We have
argued that every ETR formula can be written down in this way, but the trans-
lation introduces a new vector-variable for each variable in the ETR formula.
When we apply Theorem 2 to obtain PTASs or QPTASs we require that the
number of vector variables is constant, and so this limits the application of the
theorem to ETR formulas that have constantly many variables.
The following theorem is a sampling result for -ETR with non-tensor con-
straints, which is proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Let F be an -ETR instance constrained over the convex set de-
fined by c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq. Let m be the number of constraints used in F , Let
γ = maxi ‖ci‖∞, let α be the largest constant used in F , let t be the number of
terms used in F , and let d be the maximum degree of the polynomials in F . If
exact(F ) has a solution in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl), then F has a k-uniform solution
in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) where
k = γ2d−2 · (2d − 1)2 · α2 · t2 · log l/2.
The key feature here is that the number of variables does not appear in
the formula for k, which allows the theorem to be applied to some formulas
for which Theorem 2 cannot. However, since the theorem does not allow tensor
constraints, its applicability is more limited because the number of terms t will
be much larger in non-tensor formulas. For example, as we will see in Section 5,
we can formulate bimatrix games using tensor constraints over constantly many
vector variables, and this gives a result using Theorem 2. No such result can
be obtained via Theorem 3, because when we formulate problem without tensor
constraints, the number of terms t used in the inequalities becomes polynomial.
4 The Proof of the Main Theorem
In this section we prove Theorem 2. Before we proceed with the technical results
let us provide a roadmap. We begin by considering two special cases, which when
combined will be the backbone of the proof of the main theorem.
Firstly, we will show how to deal with problems where every constraint of the
Boolean formula is a multilinear polynomial, which we will define formally later.
We deal with this kind of problems using Hoeffding’s inequality and the union
bound, which is similar to how such constraints have been handled in prior work.
Then, we study problems where the Boolean formula consists of a single
degree d polynomial constraint. We reduce this kind of problems to a constrained
/2-ETR problem with multilinear constraints, so we can use our previous result
to handle the reduced problem. Degree d polynomials have not been considered
in previous work, and so this reduction is a novel extension of sampling based
techniques to a broader class of -ETR formulas.
Finally, we deal with the main theorem: we reduce the original ETR problem
with multivariate constraints to a set of ′−ETR problems with a single standard
degree d constraint, and then we use the last result to derive a bound on k.
Problems with multilinear constraints. We begin by considering constrained
-ETR problems where the Boolean formula F consists of tensor-multilinear
polynomial constraints. We will use TML(A, x1, . . . , xn) to denote a tensor-
multilinear polynomial with n variables and coefficients defined by tensor A
of size ×nj=1p. Formally,
TML(A, x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i1∈[p]
· · ·
∑
in∈[p]
x1(i1) · . . . · xn(in) · a(i1, . . . , in) + c.
We will use α to denote the maximum entry of tensor A in the absolute value
sense and γ to denote the infinite norm of the convex set that constrains the
variables.
The following lemma is proved in Appendix C. The proof uses Hoeffding’s
inequality and the union bound, and is similar to previous applications of the
sampling technique.
Lemma 1. Let F be a Boolean formula with n variables and m tensor-multilinear
polynomial constraints and let Y be a convex set in the variables space. If the
constrained ETR problem defined by exact(F ) and Y has a solution, then the
constrained -ETR problem defined by F and Y has a k uniform solution where
k =
2 · n2 · γ2 · α2 · ln(2 ·m · n)
2
. (2)
Problems with a standard degree d constraints. We now consider con-
strained -ETR problems with exactly one tensor polynomial constraint of stan-
dard degree d. We will use TSD(A, x, d) to denote a standard degree d tensor-
polynomial with coefficients defined by the ×dj=1l tensor A. Here, d identical
vectors x are applied on A. Formally,
TSD(A, x, d) =
∑
i1∈[p
· · ·
∑
id∈[p]
x(i1) · . . . · x(id) · a(i1, . . . , id) + c.
The following lemma is proved in Appendix D. To prove the lemma we con-
sider the variable x to be defined as the average r = O(d
2·γd·α2
 ) variables.
This allows us to “break” the standard degree d tensor polynomial to a sum
of multilinear tensor polynomials and to a sum of not-too-many multivariate
polynomials. Then, the choice of r allows us to upper bound the error occurred
by the multivariate polynomials by 2 . Then, we observe that in order to prove
the lemma we can write the sum of multilinear tensor polynomials as an 2 -ETR
problem with r variables and roughly rd multilinear constraints. This allows us
to use Lemma 1 to complete the proof.
Lemma 2. Let F be a Boolean formula with variable x and one tensor-polynomial
constraint of standard degree d, and let Y be a convex set. If the constrained ETR
problem defined by exact(F ) and Y has a solution, then the constrained -ETR
problem defined by F and Y has a k-uniform solution where
k =
24 · d5 · γ2d+2 · α6 · ln(2 · d · γ · α)
4
. (3)
Problems with simple multivariate constraints. We now assume that we
are given a constraint--ETR problem defined by a Boolean formula F of ten-
sor simple multilinear polynomial constraints and a convex set Y. As before
γ = ‖Y‖∞ and let α be the maximum absolute value of the coefficients of the
constraints. We will say that the constraints are of maximum degree d, if there
is no variable with degree greater than d. The following lemma is shown in Ap-
pendix E. The idea is to rewrite the problem as an equivalent problem with
standard degree d constraints and then apply Lemmas 2 and 1 to derive the
bound for k.
Lemma 3. Let F be a Boolean formula with n variables and m simple tensor-
multivariate polynomial constraints of maximum degree d and let Y be a convex
set in the variables space. If the constrained ETR problem defined by exact(F )
and Y has a solution, then the constrained -ETR problem defined by F and Y
has a k uniform solution where
k =
48 · n6 · d5 · γ2d+2 · α6 · ln(2 · n · d · γ · α ·m)
4
. (4)
The proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Assume that x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n ∈ Y is a solution for exact(F ). Consider now a
multivariate constraint i ∈ [m] of F defined by TMVi(x1, . . . , xn). Firstly, we
replace this constraint by
|TMVi(x1, . . . , xn)− TMVi(x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤ . (5)
Then, replace Constraint (5) by t constraints of the form
|STMi,j(x1, . . . , xn)− STMi,j(x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤

t
(6)
where STMi,1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , STMi,t(x1, . . . , xn) are the simple tensor multi-
variate polynomials TMVi(x1, . . . , xn) consists of. By the triangle inequality we
get that if all t constraints given by (6) hold, then Constraint (5) holds as well.
Hence, we can reduce the problem to an equivalent problem with the same n
variables and m · t constraints that all of them are simple tensor multivariate
polynomials. So, we can apply Lemma 3 where we replace m with m · t and 
with t . This completes the theorem. uunionsq
5 Applications
We now show how our theorems can be applied to derive new approximation
algorithms for a variety of problems.
Constrained approximate Nash equilibria. A constrained Nash equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium that satisfies some extra constraints, like specific bounds on
the payoffs of the players. Constrained Nash equilibria attracted the attention of
many authors, who proved NP-completeness for two-player games [24, 15, 6] and
ETR-completeness for three-player games [6–9, 23] for constrained exact Nash
equilibria.
Constrained approximate equilibria have been studied, but so far only lower
bounds have been derived [2, 26, 12, 20, 19]. It has been observed that sampling
methods can give QPTASs for finding constrained approximate Nash equilibria
for certain constraints in two player games [20].
By applying Theorem 2, we get the following result for games with a con-
stant number of players: Any property of an approximate equilibrium that can be
formulated in -ETR where α, γ, d, t and n are constant has a QPTAS. This
generalises past results to a much broader class of constraints, and provides
results for games with more than two players, which had not previously been
studied in this setting. The details of this result are given in Appendix F.
Shapley games. Shapley’s stochastic games [32] describe a two-player infinite-
duration zero-sum game. The game consists of N states. Each state specifies a
two-player M ×M matrix game where the players compete over: (1) a reward
(which may be negative) that is paid by player two to player one, and (2) a
probability distribution over the next state of the game. So each round consists
of the players playing a matrix game at some state s, which generates a reward,
and the next state s′ of the game. The reward in round i is discounted by λi−1,
where 0 < λ < 1 is a discount factor. The overall payoff to player 1 is the
discounted sum of the infinite sequence of rewards generated during the course
of the game.
Shapley showed that these games are determined, meaning that there exists a
value vector v, where vs is the value of the game starting at state s. A polynomial-
time algorithm has been devised for computing the value vector of a Shapley
game when the number of states N is constant [25]. However, since the values
may be irrational, this algorithm needs to deal with algebraic numbers, and the
degree of the polynomial is O(N)N
2
, so if N is even mildly super-constant, then
the algorithm is not polynomial.
Shapley showed that the value vector is the unique solution of a system of
polynomial optimality equations, which can be formulated in ETR. Any ap-
proximate solution of these equations gives an approximation of the value vec-
tor, and applying Theorem 2 gives us a QPTAS. This algorithm works when
N ∈ O( 6√logM), which is a value of N that prior work cannot handle. The
downside of our algorithm is that, since we require the solution to be bounded
by a convex set, the algorithm only works when the value vector is reasonably
small. Specifically, the algorithm takes a constant bound B ∈ R, and either finds
the approximate value of the game, or verifies that the value is strictly greater
than B. The details of the algorithm are given in Appendix G.
Optimization problems. Our framework can provide approximation schemes
for optimization problems with one vector variable x ∈ Rp with polynomial
constraints over bounded convex sets. Formally,
max h(x)
s.t. h1(x) > 0, . . . , hm(x) > 0
x ∈ conv(c1, . . . , cl)
where h(x), h1(x), . . . , hm(x) are polynomials with respect to vector x; for ex-
ample h(x) = xTAx, where A is an p × p matrix, subject to h1(x) = xTx > 110
and x ∈ ∆p. We will call the polynomials hi solution-constraints. Optimization
problems of this kind received a lot of attention over the years [16–18, 22].
For optimization problems, we sample from the solution that achieves the
maximum when we apply Theorem 2, in order to prove that there is a k-uniform
solution that is close to the maximum. Our algorithm enumerates all k-uniform
profiles, and outputs the one that maximizes the objective function. Using this
technique, Theorem 2 gives the following results.
1. There is a PTAS if h(x) is a TSD polynomial of constant degree and the
number of solution-constraints independent of p and l = poly(p).
2. There is QPTAS if h(x) is an SMV polynomial of degree for poly log p and
the number of solution-constraints is poly(p) and l = poly(p).
To the best of our knowledge, the second result is new. The first result was
already known, however it was proven using completely different techniques:
in [10] it was proven for the special case of degree two, in [22] it was extended to
any fixed degree, and alternative proofs of the fixed degree case were also given in
[17, 18]. We highlight that in all of the aforementioned results solution constraints
were not allowed. Note, that unless NP=ZPP there is no FPTAS for quadratic
programming even when the variables are constrained in the simplex [16]. Hence,
our results can be seen as a partial answer to the important question posed
in [16]: “What is a complete classification of functions that allow a PTAS?”
Tensor problems. Our framework provides quasi-polynomial time algorithms
for deciding the existence of approximate eigenvalues and approximate eigenvec-
tors of tensors in Rp×p×p, where the elements are bounded by a constant, where
the solutions are required to be in a convex set. In [27] it is proven that there is
no PTAS for these problems when the domain is unrestricted. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first positive result for the problem even in this, restricted,
setting. The details of the algorithm are given in Appendix H.
Computational geometry. Finally, we note that our theorem can be applied
to problems in computational geometry, although the results are not as general
as one may hope. Many problems in this field are known to be ETR-complete,
including, for example, the Steinitz problem for 4-polytopes, inscribed poly-
topes and delaunay triangulations, polyhedral complexes, segment intersection
graphs, disk intersection graphs, dot product graphs, linkages, unit distance
graphs, point visibility graphs, rectilinear crossing number, and simultaneous
graph embeddings. We refer the reader to the survey of Cardinal [14] for further
details.
All of these problems can be formulated in -ETR, and indeed our theorem
does give results for these problems. However, our requirement that the bound-
ing convex set be given explicitly limits their applicability. Most computational
geometry problems are naturally constrained by a cube, so while Corollary 2 does
give NP algorithms, we do not get QPTASs unless we further restrict the convex
set. In Appendix I we formulate QPTASs for the segment intersection graph and
the unit disk intersection graph problems when the solutions are restricted to
lie in a simplex. While it is not clear that either problem has natural applica-
tions that are restricted in this way, we do think that future work may be able
to derive sampling theorems that are more tailored towards the computational
geometry setting.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we will show that unconstrained -ETR = ETR for all  ∈ R.
Every -ETR instance can be trivially reduced in polynomial time to an ETR
instance by replacing each constraint of the form x = y with the constraint
x = y + , and likewise translating < and ≤ to their exact counterparts.
It is less obvious that every ETR formula can be reformulated as an -
ETR formula. We will prove this by modifying a technique of Schaefer and
Stefankovic [31]. They considered the following problem, which asks us to find a
shared root of a system of polynomials.
Definition 4 (Feas). Given a system of k multi-variate polynomials pi : Rn →
Rn, decide whether there exists an x ∈ Rn such that pi(x) = 0 for all i.
Schaefer and Stefankovic showed that this problem is ETR-complete.
Theorem 4 ([31]). Feas is ETR-complete.
We will reduce Feas to -ETR. Let P = (pi)i=1,...,k be an instance of Feas,
and let L be the number of bits needed to represent this instance. We define
gap(P ) = 2−2
L+5
. The following lemma was shown by Schaefer and Stefankovic.
Lemma 4 ([31]). Let P = (pi)i=1,...,k be an instance of Feas. If there does not
exist an x ∈ Rn such that pi(x) = 0 for all i, then for every x ∈ Rn there exists
an i such that |pi(x)| > gap(P ).
In other words, if the instance of Feas is not solvable, then one of the poly-
nomials will always be bounded away from 0 by at least gap(P ).
The reduction. The first task is to build an -ETR formula that ensures that
a variable t ∈ R satisfies t ≥ / gap(P ). This can be done by the standard
trick of repeated squaring, but we must ensure that the -inequalities do not
interfere with the process. We define the following formula over the variables
t, g1, g2, . . . , gL+5 ∈ Rn, where all of the following constraints are required to
hold.
g1 ≥ 2 + ,
gi ≥ g2i−1 +  for all i > 1.
t ≥  · gL+5 + 
In other words, this requires that g1 ≥ 2, and gi ≥ g2i−1. So we have gL+5 ≥ 22
L+5
,
and hence t ≥ / gap(P ). Note that the size of this formula is polynomial in the
size of P .
Given an instance P = (pi)i=1,...,k of Feas we create the following -ETR
instance ψ, where all of the following are required to hold.
t · pi(x) ≤ 0 for all i, (7)
t · pi(x) ≥ 0 for all i, (8)
t ≥ / gap(P ), (9)
where the final inequality is implemented using the construction given above.
Lemma 5. ψ is satisfiable if and only if P has a solution.
Proof. First, let us assume that P has a solution. This means that there exists
an x ∈ Rn such that pi(x) = 0 for all i. Note that x clearly satisfies Inequalities 7
and 8, while Inequality 9 can be satisfied by fixing t to be any number greater
than / gap(P ). So we have proved that ψ is satisfiable.
On the other hand, now we will assume that x ∈ Rn satisfies ψ. Note that
we must have
pi(x) ≤ /t ≤ gap(P )
and likewise
pi(x) ≥ −/t ≥ − gap(P ),
and hence |pi(x)| ≤ gap(P ) for all i. But Lemma 4 states that this is only
possible in the case where P has a solution. uunionsq
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 3
We will use the following is a theorem of Barman.
Theorem 5 ([4]). Let c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq with maxi ‖ci‖∞ ≤ 1. For every x ∈
conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) and every  > 0 there exists a O(log l/
2)-uniform vector
x′ ∈ conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) such that ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ .
The following lemma shows that if we take two vectors x and x′ that are close
in the L∞ norm, then for all polynomials p the value of |p(x)− p(x′)| cannot be
too large.
Lemma 6. Let p(x) be a multivariate polynomial over x ∈ Rq with degree d and
let  ∈ (0, γ] for some constant γ > 0. For every pair of vectors x, x′ ∈ [0, γ]q
with ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤  we have:
|p(x)− p(x′)| ≤ γd−1 · (2d − 1) · consts(p) · terms(p) · .
Proof. Consider a term of p(x), which can without loss of generality be written
as t(x) = c · ∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi , where it could be the case that any number of xi’s are the
same. We have
|t(x)− t(x′)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
c ·
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi − c ·
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
(xi + )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −

∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi +
(
d
1
)
γd−1+
(
d
2
)
γd−22 + · · ·+
(
d
d
)
γ0d

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣ ·
d∑
k=1
(
d
k
)
γd−1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·  · γd−1 ·
d∑
k=1
(
d
k
)
=  · c · γd−1 · (2d − 1),
where the second to last four lines use the fact that xi’s, and  are all less than
or equal to γ.
Next consider a term t(x) of p(x) of degree d′ ≤ d. This can be written
similarly to the aforementioned term. Then |t(x)− t(x′)| ≤ c ·  ·γd−1 · (2d′−1) ≤
c ·  ·γd−1 · (2d− 1). Since there are terms(p) many terms in p, we therefore have
that
|p(x)− p(x′)| ≤ γd−1 · (2d − 1) · consts(p) · terms(p) · .
uunionsq
We now apply this to prove Theorem 3.
Proof (of Theorem 3). Let x be the solution to exact(F ). First we apply Theo-
rem 5 to find a point y that is k-uniform, where k = γ2d−2·(2d−1)2·α2·t2·log l/2,
such that
‖x− y‖∞ ≤ /(γd−1 · (2d − 1) · α · t).
Next we can apply Lemma 6 to argue that, for each polynomial p used in F , we
have
|p(x)− p(y)| ≤ γd−1 · (2d − 1) · α · t ·
(

γd−1 · (2d − 1) · α · t
)
= .
Since all constraints of F have a tolerance of , and since x satisfies exact(F ),
we can conclude that F (y) is satisfied. uunionsq
C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ Y be a solution for exact(F ). Since we assume the
Y is a convex set of c1, . . . , cl any x ∈ Y can be written as a convex combination
of the ci’s, i.e., x =
∑
i∈[l] ai · ci, where ai ≥ 0 for every i ∈ [l], and
∑
i∈[l] ai = 1.
Observe, a = (a1, . . . , al) corresponds to a probability distribution over c1, . . . , cl,
where vector ci is drawn with probability ai, and x can be thought of as the
mean of a. So, we can “sample” a point by sampling over cis according to the
probability that define this point.
For every i ∈ [n], let x′i be a k-uniform vector sampled independently from
x∗i . To prove the lemma, we will show that, because of the choice of k, with
positive probability the sampled vectors satisfy every constraint of the -ETR
problem. Then, by the probabilistic method the lemma will follow.
Let TMLj(Aj , x1, . . . , xn) be a multilinear polynomial that defines a con-
straint of F . For every j ∈ [m] we define the following constraint
|TMLj(Aj , x′1, . . . , x′n)− TMLj(Aj , x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤ . (10)
Observe that if x′1, . . . , x
′
n, satisfy inequality (10) for every j ∈ [m], then the
lemma follows.
For every j ∈ [m], we replace the corresponding Constraint (10) with n linear
constraints. For notation simplicity, let us denote MLij the multivariate polyno-
mial MLj(Aj , x1, . . . , xn) where we set x1 = x
′
1, x2 = x
′
2, . . . , xi = x
′
i and xi+1 =
x∗i+1, xi+2 = x
∗
i+2, . . . , xn = x
∗
n. Furthermore, let ML
0
j = MLj(Aj , x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n).
Then, for every i ∈ [n] we create the constraint
|MLij −MLi−1j | ≤

n
. (11)
Observe that, if all n constraints defined in (11) are satisfied, then by the triangle
inequality, the corresponding Constraint (10) is satisfied as well.
Consider now MLij . This can be seen as a random variable that depends on
the choice of x′i and takes values in [−γ · α, γ · α]. But recall that the x′i’s are
sampled from x∗i using k samples, and that they are mutually independent, so
E
[
MLij
]
= MLi−1j . Thus, we can bound the probability that a constraint (11)
is not satisfied, i.e. bound the probability that |MLij − MLi−1j | > n , using
Hoeffding’s inequality [28]. So,
Pr
(∣∣MLij −MLi−1j ∣∣ > n) = Pr(∣∣MLij − E[MLij]∣∣ > n)
≤ 2 · exp
(
− 2 · k
2 · ( n)2
4 · k · γ2 · α2
)
= 2 · exp
(
− k · 
2
2 · n2 · γ2 · α2
)
. (12)
Recall, that we have n · m constraints of the form (11). We can bound the
probability that any of those constraints is violated, via the union bound. So,
using (12) and the union bound, the probability that any of these constraints is
violated is upper bounded by
2 ·m · n · exp
(
− k · 
2
2 · n2 · γ2 · α2
)
. (13)
Hence, if the value of (13) is strictly less than 1, then x′1, . . . , x
′
m satisfy all of
the n ·m linear constraints, and thus the lemma follows. If we solve (13) for k,
such that it is strictly less than 1, we get
k >
n2 · γ2 · α2 · ln(2 · n ·m)
2
which holds, by our choice of k.
uunionsq
D Proof of Lemma 2
To prove the lemma we will first prove the following auxiliary Lemma.
Lemma 7. Let F be a Boolean formula with one variable and one tensor-
polynomial constraint of standard degree d, let Y be a convex set, and let r =
2·(d−1)2·γd·α2
 . If the constrained ETR problem exact(F ) has a solution in Y, then
there exists a satisfiable constrained 2 −ETR problem ΠML with r variables and∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) tensor multilinear constraints, such that every solution of ΠML in
Y can be transformed to a solution for the constrained -ETR problem defined
by F and Y.
Proof. Assume that x∗ ∈ Y is a solution for F . Let TSD(A, x, d) denote the
tensor polynomial of standard degree d used in F . For notation simplicity, let
TSD(A, x, d) = A(xd). Create r new variables x1, . . . , xr ∈ Y and set x =
1
r (x1 + . . . + xr). Let X =
⋃r
i=1{xi} be a multiset of Y with cardinality r,
meaning that multiple copies of an element of Y are allowed in X . In the sequel
we will treat the elements of X as distinct, even though some might correspond to
the same element of Y. Then, note that A(xd) can be written as a sum of simple
tensor-multivariate polynomials where some of them are multilinear and have as
variables x1, . . . , xr. Now, let S be the set of all ordered d-tuples that can be made
by drawing d elements from X with replacement. Formally, S = {(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) :
xˆ1, . . . , xˆd ∈ X}. Let us also define Sd to be the set of all ordered d-tuples that
can be made by drawing d elements from X without replacement. Formally,
Sd = {(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) : xˆ1, . . . , xˆd ∈ X , xˆ1, . . . , xˆd are pairwise different}, and
observe that |Sd| =
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i). So, any element of Sd, combined with tensor
A, produces a multilinear polynomial. Hence, using the notation introduced, we
get that |A(xd)−A(x∗d)| is less than or equal to sum of
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ and (14)
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈S−Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ . (15)
Observe, |S−Sd| = rd−|Sd| and that
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ γd ·α for every
A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd). Then, for the sum given in (15) we get
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈S−Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣
≤
(
1− r · (r − 1) · · · (r − d+ 1)
rd
)
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− 1
r
)(
1− 2
r
)
·
(
1− d− 1
r
))
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− d− 1
r
)d−1)
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− (d− 1)
2
r
))
· γd · α
=
(d− 1)2
r
· γd · α
≤ 
2
.
Hence, in order for the original constraint to be satisfied, it suffices to satisfy the
constraint
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ 
2
. (16)
Observe that |Sd| =
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) < rd, therefore, instead of the constraint (16),
it suffices to deal with the following |Sd| constraints (we introduce one constraint
for every (xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) ∈ Sd)∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ 
2
. (17)
The proof is completed by setting the set of tensor-multilinear constraints to be
the union of
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) constraints defined by (17).
uunionsq
We can combine Lemma 1 with Lemma 7 and prove Lemma 2.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). Firstly, use Lemma 7 to construct the constrained

2 − ETR problem ΠML with tensor-multilinear constraints. Recall that ΠML
has r = 2·(d−1)
2·γd·α2
 variables and
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) < rd constraints. Then, from
Lemma 1 we know that if ΠML is satisfiable, then there exist
k
r -uniform vectors
x′1 ∈ Y, . . . , x′r ∈ Y that /2-satisfy ΠML. Finally, observe that x′ = 1r · (x′1 +
. . .+ x′r) is k-uniform. uunionsq
E Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let x∗1, . . . , x
∗
m be a solution for exact(F ). Let r =
2·n·(d−1)2·γd·aˆ2
 and let
xˆi1, . . . , xˆ
i
r be
k
r -uniform vectors sampled from x
∗
i . Define x
′
i =
1
r (xˆ
i
1 + . . .+ xˆ
i
r).
Consider a constraint in j ∈ [m] defined by the simple tensor-multivariate
polynomial STMj(Aj , x
d1
1 , . . . , x
dm
m ). We will use the same technique we used
in Lemma 1 to create n constraints, where constraint i ∈ [n] is defined via a
simple degree di polynomial. Again, for notation simplicity for every i ∈ [m] we
use STMij to denote the polynomial STMj(Aj , x
d1
1 , . . . , x
dm
m ) where we set x1 =
x′1, . . . , xi = x
′
i and xi+1 = x
∗
i+1, . . . , xn = x
∗
n. Let STM
0
j := STMj(Aj , (x
∗
1)
d1 , . . . , (x∗n)
dn).
Then, we define the following n constraints
|STMij −STMi−1j | ≤

2n
. (18)
Observe that every constraint i of the form (18) defines simple degree di poly-
nomial with respect to variable x′i. Furthermore, observe that if every such con-
straint is satisfied, then the initial constraint defined by STMj(Aj , x
d1
1 , . . . , x
dn
n )
is satisfied too. Then, we convert each such constraint to a set of
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i)
multilinear constraints with r variables, using Lemma 7 where we demand that
every multilinear constraint is 2·n -satisfied. The proof is then completed by us-
ing Lemma 1 where we observe that we have r · n < 2·n2·d2·γd···α2 variables and∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) · n ·m < rd · n ·m constraints and we set  to 2·n . uunionsq
F Constrained Approximate Nash equilibria application
A game is defined by the set of players, the set of actions for every player, and
the payoff function of every player. In normal form games, the payoff function is
given by a multilinear function on a tensor of appropriate size. Consider an n-
player game where every player has l-actions, and let Aj denote the payoff tensor
of player j with elements in [0, 1]; Aj has size ×ni=1l. The interpretation of the
tensor Aj is the following: the element Aj(i1, . . . , in) of the tensor corresponds
to the payoff of player j when Player 1 chooses action i1, Player 1 chooses
action i2, and so on. To play the game, every player j chooses a probability
distribution xj ∈ ∆l, a.k.a. a strategy, over their actions. A collection of strategies
is called strategy profile. The expected payoff of player j under the strategy
profile (x1, . . . , xn) is given by ML(Aj , x1, . . . , xn). For notation simplicity, let
uj(xj , x−j) := ML(Aj , x1, . . . , xn), where x−j is the strategy profile of all players
except player j. A strategy profile (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if for every
player j it holds that uj(x
∗
j , x
∗
−j) ≥ uj(xj , x∗−j) for every xj ∈ ∆l, or equivalently
uj(x
∗
j , x
∗
−j) ≥ uj(sp, x∗−j) for every possible sp, where sp denotes the case where
player j chooses their action p with probability 1.
Our framework formally captures the set of constrains that we can get a QP-
TAS for computing approximate Nash equilibria in games with constant number
of players.
Theorem 6. Let Γ be an n-player l-action normal form game Γ where n is
constant. Furthermore, let F be a Boolean formula with c = poly(l) TSM con-
straints of constant degree and of constant length with variables the strategies
of the players. Then in a quasi-polynomial time we can compute a approximate
NE of Γ constrained by F , or decide that no such constrained approximate NE
exists.
Proof. Observe that we can write the problem of the existence of a constrained
Nash equilibrium as an ETR problem. The constraints of the problem will be
the constraints of F plus the constraint
uj(sl, x−j)− uj(xj , x−j) ≤ 0
for every player i ∈ [m] and every action sl of player j.
Thus, we can use Theorem 2 and complete the proof since we produced an
-ETR problem with m = c+ n · l = poly(l) constraints, which is polynomial in
the input size; d and t are constants by assumption; γ = 1 since every variable
is a probability distribution; α = 1 by the definition of normal form games. uunionsq
G Shapley’s stochastic games application
To formally define a Shapley game, we use N to denote the number of states,
and M to denote the number of actions. The game is defined by the following
two functions.
– For each s ≤ N and j, k ≤M the function r(s, j, k) gives the reward at state
s when player one chooses action j and player two chooses action k.
– For each s, s′ ≤ N and j, k ≤M the function p(s, s′, j, k) gives the probability
of moving from state s to state s′ when player one chooses action j and player
two chooses action k. It is required that
∑N
s′=1 p(s, s
′, j, k) = 1 for all s, j,
and k.
The game begins at a given starting state. In each round of the game the
players are at a state s, and play the matrix game at that state by picking an
action from the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}. The players are allowed to use randomization
to make this choice. Supposing that the first player chose action j and the
second player chose the action k, the first player receives the reward r(s, j, k),
and then a new state s′ is chosen according to the probability distribution given
by p(s, ·, j, k).
The reward in future rounds is discounted by a factor of λ where 0 < λ < 1
in each round. So if r1, r2, . . . is the infinite sequence of rewards, the total reward
paid by player two to player one is
∑∞
i=1 λ
i−1 · ri, which, due to the choice of λ,
is always a finite value.
The two players play the game by specifying a probability distribution at
each state, which represents their strategy for playing at that state. Let ∆M
denote the M -dimensional simplex, which represents the strategy space for both
players at a single state. For each x, y ∈ ∆M , we overload notation by defining
the expected reward and next state functions.
r(s, x, y) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
x(j) · y(k) · r(s, i, j),
p(s, s′, x, y) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
x(j) · y(k) · p(s, s′, i, j).
Shapley showed that these games are determined [32], meaning that there is
a unique vector v ∈ RN such that vs is the value of the game starting at state
s: player one has a strategy to ensure that the expected reward is at least v(s),
while player two has a strategy to ensure that the expected reward is at most
v(s). Furthermore, Shapley showed that this value vector is the unique solution
of the following optimality equations [32]. For each state s we have the equation
v(s) = min
x∈∆M
max
y∈∆M
(
r(s, x, y) + λ ·
N∑
s′=1
p(s, s′, x, y) · vs′
)
. (19)
In other words, vs must be the value of the one-shot zero-sum game at s, where
the payoffs of this zero-sum game are determined by the values of the other
states given by vs′ .
Theorem 7. Let Γ be a Shapley game with N ∈ O( 6√logm), unbounded number
of actions per state, and rewards in [−c, c] for every state-action combination,
where c is a constant. Furthermore, let s be the starting state of the game. Let
B ∈ R be a constant. In a quasi-polynomial time we can approximately compute
the value of Γ starting from s, if the value of every state less than or equal to
B, or decide that at least one of these values is greater than or equal to B.
Proof. Let v = (v(1), v(2), . . . , v(N)), and for every state s let xs and ys denote
the strategy player one and player two choose at state s respectively. Observe
that r(s, xs, ys) is an STM polynomial with variables x and y of the form
STM(As1, xs, ys) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
xs(j) · ys(k) · as1(j, k)
where as1(i, j, k) = r(s, j, k).
Observe furthermore that λ ·∑Ns′=1 p(s, s′, xs, ys) · vs′ can be written as an
STM polynomial with variables x, y and v of the form
STM(As2, x, y, v) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
xs(j) · ys(k) · v(l) · as2(j, k, l)
where as2(i, j, k) = λ · p(s, l, j, k).
Let us define TMVs(xs, ys, v) = STM(As1, xs, ys)+STM(As2, xs, ys, v); TMVs(xs, ys, v)
has length 2 and degree 1.
Observe, we can replace Equation (19) with the following 2 ·M TMV poly-
nomial constraints
TMV(xs, ys, v)− TMV(j, ys, v) ≤ 0 for every action j ≤M of player one
TMV(xs, k, v)− TMV(xs, ys, v) ≥ 0 for every action k ≤M of player two.
So, to approximate v(s) it suffices to solve the -ETR problem defined by
the 2 · M · N constraints defined as above for every state s ≤ N . Observe,
the -ETR problem has: 2N + 1 variables (x1 through xN , y1 through yN ,
and v); 2 ·M · N TMV constraints; γ = max{1,maxs v(s)}; α = max{c, λ ·
maxs,s′,j,k p(s, s
′, j, k)
}
= max{c, 1}, since λ < 1 and maxs,s′,j,k p(s, s′, j, k) < 1.
So, if N ∈ 6√logm, maxs v(s) is constant, and c is a constant, we can use Theo-
rem 2 and derive a QPTAS for (19).
Finally, we note that an approximate solution to (19) gives an approximation
of the value vector itself. This is because Shapley has shown that, when v is
treated as a variable, the optimality equation given in (19) is a contraction map.
The value vector is a fixed point of this contraction map, and the uniqueness of
the value vector is guaranteed by Banach’s fixed point theorem. Our algorithm
produces an approximate fixed point of the optimality equations. It is easy to
show, using the contraction map property, that an approximate fixed point must
be close to an exact fixed point. uunionsq
H Tensor Problems
Definition 5. The nonzero vector x ∈ Rp is an eigenvector of tensor A ∈
Rp×p×p if there exists an eigenvalue λ ∈ R such that for every k ∈ [p] it holds
that
n∑
i
n∑
j
a(i, j, k) · x(i) · x(j) = λ · x(k). (20)
Theorem 8. Let A be an Rp×p×p tensor with entries in [−c, c], where c is a
constant. Furthermore, let B ∈ R be a constant and let Y be a convex set where
‖Y‖∞ is a constant. In a quasi-polynomial time we can compute an eigenvalue-
eigenvector pair (λ, x) that approximately satisfy (20) such that λ ≤ B and
x ∈ Y, or decide that no such pair exists.
Proof. Observe that
∑n
i
∑n
j a(i, j, k) · x(i) · x(j) can be written as an STM
polynomial STM(A1, x
2) where a1(i, j) = a(i, j, k). Furthermore, let ` be a
p-dimensional vector. Then, λ · x(k) can be written as an STM polynomial
STM(A2, x, `), where a2(k, 1) = 1 and zero otherwise.
So, Equation 20 can be written as an TMV polynomial constraint of degree
2 and length 2, with two vector variables, x and `. So, the problem of computing
an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair that approximately satisfy (20) can be written as
an -ETR problem with p TMV polynomial constraints of degree 2 and length
2 and two vector variables. Hence, we can use Theorem 2 with γ = ‖Y‖∞ which
is constant, α = c, n = 2, t = 2, d = 2, and m = p to find a solution if exists, or
decide that no such solution exists. uunionsq
I Computational Geometry Applications
I.1 Segment intersection graphs
Definitions. Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We
say that G is a segment graph if there are straight segments s1, s2, . . . , sn in the
plane such that, for every i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, the segments si and sj have a
common point if and only if {vi, vj} ∈ E(G).
By a suitable rotation of the co-ordinate system we can achieve that none
of the segments is vertical. Then the segment si representing vertex vi can be
algebraically described as the set {(x, y) ∈ R2 : y = aix + bi, ci ≤ x ≤ di} for
some real numbers ai, bi, ci, di. We say that G is a simplex K segment graph if
the real numbers ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, 2, . . . n are under the constraints
ai, bi, ci, di ≥ 0, for every i = 1, 2, . . . n, and
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi + ci + di) = K, where K > 0 is a given constant.
We let SIM-K-SEG denote the class of all simplex K segment graphs with pa-
rameter K > 0.
The problem -RECOG(SIM-K-SEG) is defined as follows. Given an abstract
undirected graph G, does it belong with tolerance  to SIM-K-SEG?
Formulation of -RECOG(SIM-K-SEG). We first give a description for the
problem with  = 0 and then we generalize for arbitrary  ≥ 0. The formulation
is taken from [30].
Letting li be the line containing si, we note that si ∩ sj 6= ∅ if li and lj
intersect in a single point whose x-coordinate lies in both the intervals [ci, di]
and [cj , dj ]. As is easy to calculate, that x-coordinate equals
bj−bi
ai−aj .
Now we turn to the general case where  ≥ 0. Let us introduce variables
Ai, Bi, Ci, Di representing the unknown quantities ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By
the problem’s definition we require the vector (A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn)
to be in the (4n−1)-simplex with parameter K. Then si∩sj 6= ∅ can be expressed
by the following predicate:
INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di,Aj , Bj , Cj , Dj) =
(Ai > Aj ∧ Ci(Ai −Aj) ≤ Bj −Bi ≤ Di(Ai −Aj)
∧ Cj(Ai −Aj) ≤ Bj −Bi ≤ Dj(Ai −Aj))
∨(Ai < Aj ∧ Ci(Ai −Aj) ≥ Bj −Bi ≥ Di(Ai −Aj)
∧ Cj(Ai −Aj) ≥ Bj −Bi ≥ Dj(Ai −Aj))
(this is only correct if we “globally” assume that Ci ≤ Di for all i). The existence
of a SEG-representation of G can then be expressed by the formula
(∃A1B1C1D1 . . . AnBnCnDnK)
(
n∧
i=1
Ci ≤ Di
)
∧
 ∧
{i,j}∈E
INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Aj , Bj , Cj , Dj)

∧
 ∧
{i,j}/∈E
¬INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Aj , Bj , Cj , Dj)

Theorem 9. There is an algorithm that runs in time nO(K
2·logn/2) and ei-
ther finds a vector (A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn) that is a solution to -
RECOG(SIM-K-SEG), or determines that there is no solution to 0-RECOG(SIM-
K-SEG).
Proof. We set x = (A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn) and F (x) to be the
above formula that we constructed. Their combination makes an -ETR in-
stance. Vector x is constrained over the convex set defined by the vertices of
the (4n − 1)-simplex, i.e. vectors vi ∈ R4n, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . 4n} with their i-th ele-
ment equal to K and the rest equal to 0. Therefore the cardinality of our convex
set is m = 4n, and γ = K. By looking at the formula we can conclude that
a = 1, t = 4, and d = 2. By Theorem 3 the result follows. uunionsq
I.2 Unit disk intersection graphs
Definitions. Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We
say that G is a unit disk intersection graph or unit disk graph if there are disks
d1, d2, . . . , dn (in the plane) with radius 1 such that, for every i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
the disks di and dj have more than one points common (i.e. an area) if and only
if {vi, vj} ∈ E(G).
The disk di representing vertex vi can be algebraically described as the set
{(x, y) ∈ R2 : (x − xi)2 + (y − yi)2 ≤ 1} for some real numbers xi, yi that
determine the centre of the disk. We say that G is a simplex K unit disk graph
if the real numbers xi, yi, i = 1, 2, . . . n are under the constraints
xi, yi ≥ 0, for every i = 1, 2, . . . n, and
n∑
i=1
(xi + yi) = K, where K > 0 is a given constant.
We let SIM-K-UDG denote the class of all simplex K unit disk graphs with
parameter K > 0.
The problem -RECOG(SIM-K-UDG) is defined as follows. Given an abstract
undirected graph G, does it belong with tolerance  to SIM-K-UDG?
Formulation of -RECOG(SIM-K-UDG). Let us introduce variables Xi, Yi rep-
resenting the unknown quantities xi, yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We require the vector
(X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) to be in the (2n − 1)-simplex with parameter K. Then we
consider an -intersection di ∩ dj 6= ∅ to happen if:√
(Xi −Xj)2 + (Yi − Yj)2 < 2 + 
and an -non-intersection di ∩ dj = ∅ to happen if:√
(Xi −Xj)2 + (Yi − Yj)2 ≥ 2− 
The existence of a UDG-representation ofG can then be expressed by the formula
(∃X1Y1 . . . XnYn) ∧
{i,j}∈E
(Xi −Xj) · (Xi −Xj) + (Yi − Yj) · (Yi − Yj) < 4 + 2+ 2

∧
 ∧
{i,j}/∈E
(Xi −Xj) · (Xi −Xj) + (Yi − Yj) · (Yi − Yj) ≥ 4− 2+ 2

Theorem 10. There is an algorithm that runs in time nO(K
2·logn/2) and either
finds a vector (X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) that is a solution to -RECOG(SIM-K-UDG),
or determines that there is no solution to 0-RECOG(SIM-K-UDG).
Proof. We set x = (X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) and F (x) to be the above formula that
we constructed. Their combination makes an -ETR instance. Vector x is con-
strained over the convex set defined by the vertices of the (2n− 1)-simplex, i.e.
vectors vi ∈ R2n, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . 2n} with their i-th element equal to K and the rest
equal to 0. Therefore the cardinality of our convex set is m = 2n, and γ = K.
By looking at the formula we can conclude that a = 2, t = 7, and d = 2. By
Theorem 3 the result follows. uunionsq
